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Re:Ranked-choice voting is on the ballot in New York City by drdeca on Saturday October 26, 2019 @01:35AM (#21361919)
Another thing that I think is relevant is the "revelation principle", which says that any "social choice function" that can be implemented by some mechanism, can be implemented by a truthful social choice mechanism.

But it seems clear that the thing that I proposed as being an improvement on random ballot can't count as a mechanism which implements a "social choice function", because there can't be an equivalent mechanism which is truthful (... well, I assume that no probability mix of pairwise votes and random ballot stuff is equivalent to the thing I described. Can't see how it could be.).

And I think the reason why is that the thing that I described (or, any fully specified version of it) would have to have multiple Nash equilibria.

So, for it to make sense to call it a Pareto improvement, I think would need to have that _all_ of the Nash equilibria would be Pareto improvements on the thing.

I am now less confident than I was that such an improvement exists.

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