Well, they have Facebook, don't they?
> All Tunisian ISPs are owned by the government
They don't need to use their ISP's service. They can sign up for any one of thousands of secure, out-of-the-country accounts.
Nearly all your reasons for rejecting email apply to Facebook too.
> Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube (unlike email) allows people to see updates without having to know about the email list
No. Not at all. "The email list" in the case of a revolution should obviously include everyone you know. Facebook is closed off to only the people you know. It doesn't matter if you don't know that someone is politically active. It's a motherfucking revolution, they're going to be interested. Email them.
Most of them have Facebook but don't have servers -- or skills to administer it.
They may not have a credit card to pay for these secure out-of-the-country hosting accounts; if they do, the government will be monitoring their transactions so they'll get exposed anyhow.
> "The email list" in the case of a revolution should obviously include everyone you know.
Nonsense. In a country like Tunisia you may well be putting somebody's job at risk if you send political mail to their work account, so you have to be a lot more discerning. And this has been going on for over a month - if an activist sent all the updates to all of their friends in email, people would have long since stopped reading.
Why do you think the government ignores Facebook completely when monitoring connections? In many cases sending Facebook messages allows the government to eavesdrop even easier.
In times of revolution, encrypt your communications. Even Gmail has full SSL - if you trust Google. If not, there are others.
How can anyone know what someone's email reads when it was sent over SSL? I never mentioned "work email" either, that's probably a silly idea. But everyone has a personal account too.
> I never mentioned "work email" either, that's probably a silly idea. But everyone has a personal account too.
Maybe, but not everybody knows it -- for a lot of current and former colleagues, I just have their work accounts.
Email is sent plaintext by default. Your scheme would work if everyone just used foreign-hosted web email providers with the option for SSL selected. But all you need is for one person on the list to be not following instructions and downloading their email using unencrypted POP to their home PC in the wrong country, and your adversary can intercept your comms in plaintext.
So, it's a reasonable suggestion, and I might try it next time I'm running an activist campaign. But Facebook looks like an easier alternative to me.
Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube (unlike email) allows people to see updates without having to know about the email list. So that makes it much easier for a movement to get the word out beyond its core supporters and for like-minded people to find each other: "Oh look, my neighbor/colleague/second cousin just posted an article from Al Jazeera on Facebook. Funny, I didn't know she was political. Maybe we should talk."
Most younger people these days do most of their news and communication via social network sites. As an activist, that's where you want to be.
And about email's supposed advantages:
> Free,
If you have a server to host it, and the networking connectivity to get to it. What percentage of activists in Tunisa do?
> safe (SSL)
If you keep the server secure.
> distributed (choose any provider you like)
All Tunisian ISPs are owned by the government