Re:On Lying
by gnode on Tuesday October 15, 2019 @08:39AM
(#21257748)
> Establishing intent requires mind-reading
Philosophical discussion of intent, unlike legal discussion, isn't necessarily concerned with what you can externally establish. It is still useful for answering questions about your own conduct, like: "would I be lying if I say something I know to be false, which I don't expect others to believe?"
I think another problem (both in philosophy and law) is that intent is not binary. If I do something without wishing a particular outcome, knowing that such outcome may likely happen, and not attempting to mitigate it, is it intentional? For instance, if I knowingly made a false accusation that some person is a criminal, uncaring whether it was perceived as sarcasm or truth, and some listeners understood it to be a truthful accusation, what is my level of culpability for libel?
Philosophical discussion of intent, unlike legal discussion, isn't necessarily concerned with what you can externally establish. It is still useful for answering questions about your own conduct, like: "would I be lying if I say something I know to be false, which I don't expect others to believe?"
I think another problem (both in philosophy and law) is that intent is not binary. If I do something without wishing a particular outcome, knowing that such outcome may likely happen, and not attempting to mitigate it, is it intentional? For instance, if I knowingly made a false accusation that some person is a criminal, uncaring whether it was perceived as sarcasm or truth, and some listeners understood it to be a truthful accusation, what is my level of culpability for libel?