AND it must always be said in the same, the pilots were not trained in what to do. (Because not training pilots is cheaper than training them.)

Boeing’s argument (and I’m inclined to agree on this specific point) is that the existing stab trim runaway checklist was an appropriate and sufficient pilot response here.

Lion Air crew did it the day before to save the aircraft. The Ethiopian Air crew almost saved their aircraft by executing that checklist. They then turned the trim back on and for whatever reason only initially commanded nose up electric trim and then stopped, leaving the system powered.

Boeing has significant fault here, but I don’t agree that pilots were not trained to deal with a stab trim runaway (obviously). The crux is whether existing stab trim runaway training was sufficient for the MCAS equipped Max. Evidence suggests it was not.

"The crux is whether existing stab trim runaway training was sufficient for the MCAS equipped Max. Evidence suggests it was not."

So, you agree with me? I'm confused.

I think the pilots were trained in what to do. Runaway stabilizer trim? Cutoff the stabilizer trim power, as you've been trained to do as one of the only 14 memory items on a 737.

They weren't trained specifically in what to do in the event of an MCAS failure, because the thinking at Boeing was that the presentation was one of stab trim runaway, something that is already trained for. I have a lot of sympathy for this point of view when looking forward from several years' ago. It turns out to have been proven wrong in the field.

Oh then I understand. I know too little, but I have a bias against megacorp.