Re:The Cost of Entrenchment: Why CEOs Are Rarely Fired
by john_horton on Thursday January 20, 2011 @09:00AM
(#2123612)
Agreed - in the short run, it wouldn't have an effect for the reason you highlight (the pool is fixed). I was thinking more about the long run, where a change in CEO probability alters the career choice of people deciding say between going into business or going to medical school, becoming a lawyer etc.
Assuming that the board isn't certain of hiring the best candidate, lots of space at the top is going to make any individual companies' talent pool worse by ensuring that other companies snag some of the best available talent for their own vacancies.
This selection problem (and your argument about signalling) might partly explain why larger companies are more willing to fire and loss-making companies are apparently no more likely to fire than profitable ones - a loss-making small company is much less confident in their ability to hire an outstanding replacement than a profit-making larger company with a board perceived as trigger-happy.