Re:Yes, browsers do cache SSL resources, so please use Googl...
by amalcon on Wednesday January 19, 2011 @05:14PM
(#2121490)
I upvoted you: everything in your comment was correct, on-point, and good advice. I'm more worried about all the people who don't follow the best practice. I know a guy who used to run web servers for dozens of clients, who didn't know about HTTP headers before I told him.
For what it's worth, in-memory caching is a totally different animal. You can expect the in-memory cache to keep a typical object for minutes or hours, depending on usage patterns. You can expect the disk cache to keep a typical object for days or weeks, across browser restarts and even system reboots.
Re:Yes, browsers do cache SSL resources, so please use Googl...
by briansmith on Wednesday January 19, 2011 @05:54PM
(#2121631)
If this caching allows a website to switch from using HTTP to HTTPS within its budget, then I think the net effect is very positive. We can't have bad website administrators/developers holding back real security improvements with their incompetence. Really, caching is a very small security impact compared to other problems that such an administrator is likely to cause.
Re:Yes, browsers do cache SSL resources, so please use Googl...
by amalcon on Wednesday January 19, 2011 @06:22PM
(#2121732)
Again, absolutely right. Remember, though, that we're not talking about the capability here: we're talking about the default. A (well-run) website can get all the caching benefits by including a HTTP header. The article is about a well-run website that does exactly this. The default only matters at all for poorly-run websites.
Given that poorly run websites are considerably less likely to be worried about scaling issues, the caching is mostly inconsequential. So, would we prefer to give the poorly-run website a mostly inconsequential security benefit or a mostly inconsequential scaling benefit?
IIRC, most browsers have cached HTTPS resources in memory (if not on disk) for a long time, so these kinds of side channel attacks have always been possible.
More generally, TLS is not good at handling side-channel (timing, caching, size measurement) attacks. If you want to mitigate side channel attacks then you need to do a lot of tedious work (that is practically impossible with current mainstream tools) at the application/HTTP layer on the server.