Re:Critical Security Issue Identified in iTerm2
by gnachman on Wednesday October 09, 2019 @03:21PM
(#21206905)
Be paranoid about what you send. It’s really clear that any time you output attacker controlled values it can be exploited. I went through several iterations of adding escaping and every one had vulnerabilities. It wasn’t good until the only escaping that remained was very conservative (hex encoded).
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Re:Critical Security Issue Identified in iTerm2
by nixpulvis on Wednesday October 09, 2019 @05:36PM
(#21208398)
I haven't had enough time to truly grasp the changes in the patch, but the use of a prefix, and a well known encoding scheme sounds a bit iffy to me.
What's stopping an attacker from looking at the definitions here: https://github.com/gnachman/iTerm2/commit/538d570ea54614d3a2... and using the same `NSUTF8StringEncoding` to build the same attacks?
EDIT: Of course GitHub doesn't follow fragment ids when they are part of a large diff, but you can open up `sources/TmuxController.m` yourself.
Re:Critical Security Issue Identified in iTerm2
by gnachman on Wednesday October 09, 2019 @06:28PM
(#21208860)
Not sure what you mean by NSUTF8StringEncoding. The important fact about encoding is that -encodedString:prefix: limits the output that iTerm2 produces to a very small set of characters from which it's hard to build an exploit.