Joking aside, fantastic work. The differentiable reformulation in the distributional attack is a tour de force.
A question. Why did you do it?
I do research because I like solving hard problems that people have never considered. I like to ensure that what I have learned will be put into practical use.
Why would 3d not be a subcase of that work?
Similarly, adversarial attacks/defenses are still being proposed for graphs, audio, and other domains because we can leverage domain-specific knowledge.
Would you have a canonical name for this distribution ? If you try matching log likelihoods, what parametric family does it resemble ? Briefly, given one of the canonical two dozen (uni/multi)variate distribution, one can create new distributions either by location-scale transform, mixtures, or say by using a k-param EFD family. So if I pick a k-param MVN ( multivariate normal with k means, k sigmas & O(k^2) correlations, I can create new distributions all day long by tweaking these 2k+k^2 params until cows come home. Brittle inference engines such as CNNs trained on a specific family with specific (hyper)parameters will fail once the distribution changes significantly, though visually the changes will be imperceptible.
In my previous paper, I've shown that moving the points around on the surface of an object does lead to imperceptible but effective adversarial attacks, as you've observed.
I'm unconvinced by this statement. There are many attempts to negate attacks that do so by applying linear transformations, masks, etc. To images. Removing pixels is not novel.
We like to imply that domain knowledge is relevant but after you design a feature vector it all ends up the same.
The time dimension adds complexity to the problem as the optimal values for the perturbation vary depending on both the immediately surrounding values, and many of the values beforehand.
When I say “hello world”, the fact I said “e” depends on the fact I said “h”. “L” depends on both “e” and “h”... etc etc.
Adds an extra dimension to the problem.
Also, distance metrics for images aren’t ideal for audio, for many reasons. That’s why audio signal processing is a different sub field vs image processing.
The approaches are similar, but we have to use different things in the end because audio behaves differently to images. Eg feature extraction through MFCC is a variant of Fourier, but specifically tailored for the human ear.
E.g. Lea Schonherr et al.’s really good Psychoacoustic attack paper.
On the negation of attacks through transforms - important to remember that an ensemble of weak defences are not strong. Many attacks have been shown to be robust to simple transformations.
This paper does suggest that we can circumvent certain domain-specific knowledge when attacking. This does not mean that we won't discover methods to utilize domain-specific knowledge in the future. I would imagine extending current provably robust methods to 3D would require domain-specific knowledge to deal with the distribution of points.
A high-level overview of the research:
Basically neural networks are weak against adversarial attacks that change the input by a little bit to cause the prediction to be wrong. We look at these adversarial attacks in 3D space, specifically on 3D point clouds (think LiDAR and RGB-D data). In the paper, four attacks in two different categories (distributional and shape attacks) are proposed. The main benefit of distributional attacks is their imperceptibility. On the other hand, shape attacks are more easily crafted in real-life (though more perceptible) and also robust against point removal defenses that were proposed in previous work. If you want a more comprehensive (but less dense than the paper) overview, take a look at my blog post [2].
[1] https://arxiv.org/abs/1901.03006
[2] https://blog.liudaniel.com/birth-of-a-new-sub-sub-field