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Re:Wireless attacks on aircraft instrument landing systems by t0mas88 on Saturday September 28, 2019 @07:05AM (#21099698)
Their test setup isn't realistic at all and looks more like a way to make the article sound interesting. Several big errors:

- They are testing a handheld radio that receives a single SDR signal. In reality a plane has two separate radios (different antenna locations) receiving a signal from a powerful antenna array at the end of the runway, that you try to squeeze your SDR signal in between. So the real attack is far different from their test setup, because you're going to have several conflicting signals instead of only one that they calculate in the test.

- If you overpower the real signal, which needs a really strong transmitter, the monitoring equipment at the airport will easily detect it. That alerts the tower and they will not allow a plane to use the approach. This monitoring is even in place in simple en-route navigation beacons (VORs)

- They claim to be able to make a plane land short of the runway, but every ILS approach has an altitude check by the pilots that's independent of the ILS signal. It works by checking the altitude based on air pressure (not spoofable) at a specific location (based on a system separate from ILS, usually DME or GPS) to the altitude at which the ILS puts the plane. If the two don't match, the pilots will break-off the approach. That check is not a nice to have, if you skip it at a flight-test (every 6 months) you would fail.

- Their calculation needs to know where the plane really is. That's easy to pull from the API of X-Plane (the hobby computer game they use as their simulator) but you don't know in the real world, unless you can see the plane. If you can see the plane, the pilots can see the runway and they're not going to be flying a CAT II or CAT III approach.

They also claim that no system exists to counteract this, but aircraft GPS systems all have mandatory error checking. If you fake a GPS signal, the receiver will compare it to the other signals and either ignore the fake signal (just like it will ignore a faulty satellite) or if not possible to calculate a correct position refuse to fly the approach.

Another alternative already available for years is MLS (microwave landing system), that has a digital signal to tell the plane its position relative to the runway. You cannot fake that without making it obvious to the receiver that you have two conflicting signals and again refusing to fly the approach.

A DoS attack on airplane landing systems is absolutely possible by jamming either ILS, MLS or GPS signals. But making an airliner land next to the runway is really not as easy as this article makes it sound.

Re:Wireless attacks on aircraft instrument landing systems by joshvm on Saturday September 28, 2019 @11:47AM (#21101001)
Even up to a CAT IIIB approach, pilots still have a decision height where you go around if you don't see the runway or the approach lights. That's not very high for CAT IIIB (15m), but pilots are trained to abort and are basically waiting with their hands on the throttle. You can find stories of people aborting landings when already over the threshold.

Here's a sim of some pilots aborting a CAT IIIB. https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=o9s2jQixK9w

Additionally the tighter the tolerances on the landing, the closer everything has to agree.

In better weather there are also physical glide slope indicators like the PAPI lights. These are the four lights to the side of the runway, if you're too low they show all red, too high they're all white. You want half red half white. They're entirely passive.

Re:Wireless attacks on aircraft instrument landing systems by tonyarkles on Saturday September 28, 2019 @09:47AM (#21100250)
I agree with your analysis here minus one nit:

> Their calculation needs to know where the plane really is [...] but you don't know in the real world

ADS-B Out from the aircraft will give you a pretty good idea where the aircraft is. Whether it's accurate enough for this attack is hard to know without doing some research, but it does transmit position.

Re:Wireless attacks on aircraft instrument landing systems by t0mas88 on Saturday September 28, 2019 @10:16AM (#21100393)
True, but it's a delayed position so I'm not sure it would help you create a signal that combines correctly with the original accurately enough.
Re:Wireless attacks on aircraft instrument landing systems by parsimo2010 on Saturday September 28, 2019 @07:17PM (#21103713)
It is delayed by at most 1 second plus the update rate of the GPS (about 0.1 seconds), and gives current heading and speed. WAAS receivers are accurate to a few meters. For a plane following an instrument approach to intercept the ILS, it would be trivial to predict their real-time position given the information available.
Re:Wireless attacks on aircraft instrument landing systems by tonyarkles on Saturday September 28, 2019 @02:58PM (#21102189)
I'm not sure what you mean by "delayed". Retrieving it from a web service might be delayed, but if you've got a radio receiver on the ground it's going to be pretty close to real-time. Plus, since they don't turn on a dime, doing motion prediction would be pretty straightforward.
Re:Wireless attacks on aircraft instrument landing systems by Animats on Saturday September 28, 2019 @02:14PM (#21101919)
FAA Order 8260/19H

2-4-5. Monitoring of navigation facilities.

a. Monitors.

It is FAA policy to provide a monitoring system for all electronic navigation facilities used in support of instrument flight procedures. Internal monitoring is provided at the facility through the use of executive monitoring equipment that causes a facility shutdown when performance deteriorates below established tolerances. A remote status indicator may also be provided through the use of a signal-sampling receiver, microwave link, or telephone circuit.

Lots of things can go wrong with a navaid, from electronics failures to storm damage moving a directional antenna. So there has to be a receiver downrange and an alarm system. The signals are jammable, but not without being noticed.

ICAO has a study on navigation in degraded environments.[2]

For GPS jammers, there are now handheld GPS jammer detector/locator units.[3]

[1] https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Order/Order_8260.1...

[2] https://www.icao.int/EURNAT/Other%20Meetings%20Seminars%20an...

[3] https://www.navtechgps.com/ctl3520_handheld_directional_gps_...

Re:Wireless attacks on aircraft instrument landing systems by cushychicken on Saturday September 28, 2019 @10:33AM (#21100475)
Articles and comments like this make me appreciate just what a deeply considered system modern commercial aviation is.
Re:Wireless attacks on aircraft instrument landing systems by GistNoesis on Saturday September 28, 2019 @07:52AM (#21099845)
How resistant are those systems with respect to tampering with the physical antenna ? Would someone tilting the antenna a few degrees towards the ground with a screwdriver cause significant perturbation ? Would flying a drone just in front of the antenna be enough to cause a misread ? What about a well positioned actively controlled reflector ?
Re:Wireless attacks on aircraft instrument landing systems by t0mas88 on Saturday September 28, 2019 @08:01AM (#21099886)
They are positioned literally at the runway, so the first protection is that you're probably not going to get to them with a screwdriver.

False glideslopes occur for many reasons, not just tilting the antenna, but also reflection or approaching them from outside the coverage area (the signal can leak in other directions). The protection is mostly in the check by the pilots that the altitude based on air pressure is correct for the indications. And there are regular calibration flights where the signals are checked against for example GPS position.

Apart from that the signals are monitored on the airport itself, but I'm not sure that would detect tilting it down just a little bit. I think it's more for other signals interfering or the transmitters failing in some way.

Edit: Oh and we have our GPS (or DME based) ground speed visible in the cockpit and know the descent rate in feet/minute (also displayed on the primary instruments) to expect for a correct glidepath with that speed. So if the descent rate is "off" almost any pilot would notice and start to think about what's causing it. If you can't figure out why the combination of data doesn't make sense, go around. That's basically in the first lesson of instrument flying.

Re:Wireless attacks on aircraft instrument landing systems by tgragnato on Saturday September 28, 2019 @09:08AM (#21100088)
Anyway, airports are highly dependent on the correct functioning of all the instruments involved in IFR approaches.

Whether it's ILS, MLS, GPS, GBAS-LS or GNSS; spoofing, jamming and replay attacks may imply the capability to degrade or disrupt airport operations.

Usenix is not publishing techniques for military grade electronic warfare... I'd hope so.

Re:Wireless attacks on aircraft instrument landing systems by gpderetta on Saturday September 28, 2019 @04:55PM (#21102795)
apparently flying a toy is enough to shutdown an airport completely for hours, so the DOS threshold is very low.
Re:Wireless attacks on aircraft instrument landing systems by tgragnato on Saturday September 28, 2019 @05:02PM (#21102844)
Re:Wireless attacks on aircraft instrument landing systems by i_am_proteus on Saturday September 28, 2019 @09:29AM (#21100175)
Aircraft position can be derived from ADS-B.

I don't think the attack could realistically cause a plane to land off-runway in normal ILS conditions, but it coul certainly shut down the airport.