That's what you would do, you weren't there though, they were. Confronting a system whose implementation details were not well known, already two potential memory item checklists into the flight to the ground.

It's easy now to point the finger and say "Airmanship" when you know the innards of the damn thing. They had one airworthyness directive, and maybe a grand total of five paragraphs in the entire manual, plus a memory item checklist that didn't accurately reflect the detail of an MCAS failure. An MCAS failure is not continuous uncommanded trim. It's discrete pulses,

I appreciate the detail and effort, and you certainly speak as an experienced member of the industry; but pushing this off to the pilot's when there is so much that had to happen before the plane left the factory for them to be in that position is a bit much.

There is whistleblower testimony that the decision to not implement a multi-sensor MCAS was intentional to avoid the financial consequences of having to have pilots put in simulator time.

You can't sit here and say the pilots weren't good enough when the manufacturer went out of their way to make sure they could skulk a plane by regulators with the least amount of training humanly possible, safety be damned. To do so is not just mad, it's unconscionable. It's the very thing of insanity. A Catch-22 if I've ever heard one.

OK, so you're here to ad hom and mock (in your other post) and then not actually speak to the question asked here (when your plane is climbing, why would you re-enable electric trim, and then not even bother to significantly retrim the plane?)

This is not the behavior I expect from someone whom I'll voluntarily talk to.