Thank you for the discussion and questions!
I know that aerodynamic instability requiring continuous correction by fly-by-wire systems has become common on fighter jets because it's necessary to achieve some of the maneuvering characteristics necessary to make them competitive. These are, of course very different priorities from commercial passenger aircraft.
Has a jetliner been certified before the 737 MAX that is aerodynamically unstable in any of the tests that it's required to pass without control inputs made by the computer without direct input from the pilot, or in contravention of the pilot's input? I know Airbus is fond of its "do what I mean" system, but that in some circumstances, Airbus flight control systems revert to essentially emulating an analog airplane. Would their flight characteristics pass certification in that mode?
I don't know if Airbus would meet certification requirements in direct control law. I suspect not. Definitely not in mechanical control law.
Just like more conventional jetliners wouldn't meet certification guidelines without all of their control rigging, counterweights, and trim systems. It's just now tempting to make adjustments to those systems with software instead of fiddling with everything else.
Many airplanes require functional (electronic) yaw damping to be safe in various flight conditions, because of dutch roll. There are also e.g. electronic control feel systems in some aircraft that must be operational to exceed certain speeds and/or altitudes and not be excessively vulnerable to PIO, etc.
Is it harder than I'm imagining in big jets, or in specific aircraft due to peculiarities of their handling characteristics?
Aircraft with swept, low wings exhibit dutch roll worse than other types (e.g. airliners). It's also worse at high speeds and high altitudes.
Yaw dampers vary based on aircraft and flight regime to "attenuating somewhat that annoying-bouncing-back-and-forth-feeling in the back of an airliner during cruise (imagine how bad it would be without active damping!)" to "preventing an oscillation from building in 2-3 cycles to a point where it will cause structural failure".
Thanks for all your input in this discussion. I find both flight in general and the case of the 737 MAX fascinating. Previously the implementation of MCAS sounded absolutely insane to me, but I can mostly understand how they got there after reading your comments.
It's building in a new control system and not telling the pilots about it that seems crazy to me.
Thanks so much for your thoughts!