No, I was assuming that the other miners continue the longest chain, not the old chain. But they'll include the transaction(s) you were trying to suppress in their blocks; they're not on your side. Each time they mine a block you have to start the attack over again, and the odds are not in your favor. You control under half the hashpower and you need to stay at least one block ahead of the main network. It's not a race you can win in the long term, even assuming a certain amount of luck.

If those transactions are larger than the wallets remaining funds that can’t happen. Aka wallet A moves coins to wallet B on the old chain and moves all it’s funds into wallet C in the new chain. In that case the A>B transaction is invalid on the new chain.

That isn't quite how Bitcoin works. Transactions use specific unspent prior transaction outputs (from the "UTxO" set) as inputs; there is no concept of "remaining funds". However, you're mostly right: if the attacker controls the private keys related to the original transaction then they can insert a conflicting transaction and make the original one permanently invalid on that chain. However, an attacker who does not have the private keys to sign a conflicting transaction cannot prevent the transaction from eventually being confirmed unless they control over 50% of the hashpower.

If you're concerned that the person you're receiving funds from might be willing to attempt a double-spend then you should wait for a suitable number of confirmations before considering the funds successfully transferred. However, if they control over 50% of the hash rate then there is no suitable number of confirmations that would make the transfer safe.