Re:Phones that secretly listen to us are a myth
by DoctorOetker on Thursday September 05, 2019 @06:42AM
(#20885424)
>planting a mass backdoor is probably not worth the risk of it being detected.
everyone is ignoring what was pointed out by "kennywinker"
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=20884384
the fact that both for android and for iphone seperately, there is a correlation with sound / silence and data usage, even if in the opposite sense. why did this not at least prompt the investigator to dig deeper?
Re:Phones that secretly listen to us are a myth
by garmaine on Thursday September 05, 2019 @03:47AM
(#20884676)
I was in fact referring to exploits in my post. That's typically how NSA and GCHQ operate these days: either find exploits, or if a sufficient number can't be found, have some hard-to-detect exploits inserted into the code by operatives or as part of unrelated bug fixes.
There's also hardware exploits. The firmware doesn't need to have a back door if a certain sequence of packets sent to the network controller will cause key memory to be overwritten and live patch in a backdoor.
Re:Phones that secretly listen to us are a myth
by ncmncm on Thursday September 05, 2019 @04:07AM
(#20884781)
Agreed, hardware backdoors are very possible, but software is much cheaper to mess with. The spooks have in the past shown a preference for hardware jimmying, but those have been one-off cases.
That said: monkey-patching is much more easily concealed than hardware or source-code changes, and is more in line with how US spooks have been seen to operate.
* Firmware is patched after the fact either by inserting a backdoor into the build process, or binary patching the resulting firmware image. Such an operation is likely to be compartmentalised to avoid employees knowing about it.
* Intelligence agencies seed online discussions with false assurances (note that I'm not suggesting any wrongdoing on your part - merely pointing out that an anonymous forum post is hardly verification that can be relied upon).
That said, I do agree that exploits are likely sufficient, and that planting a mass backdoor is probably not worth the risk of it being detected.