Say you checkout "libmagnificent" from github, browse the source and like what you see. You can build a binary and see it matches the upstream build. This gives you some (more) confidence in upstream builds.
It also lets you know you're starting from a known good source, if you want to make modifications; the changes in the build come from the changes you made to the source - not through some side effect in the build process.
The real security concern is “you’ve audited the source code for some level of safety criticalness and validated it. What guarantee do you now have that the binary you’re told was built from that exact state of source code, actually was?”
A concrete example being the UK’s audit of some Huawei firmware source code, which basically concluded “in addition to the issues we found, the builds are highly non-deterministic and we have no way of verifying whether a given firmware blob was actually built from this source or may have differed in any number of ways”
> Security. Modifying binaries instead of the upstream source code can make the changes invisible for the original authors. This can be fatal in safety-critical environments such as medical, aerospace and automotive. Promising identical results for given inputs allows third parties to come to a consensus on a correct result.
I don't understand this argument, or rather what deterministic builds have to do with this. Isn't modifying the binary instead of the source just a very bad idea in a high stakes scenario?