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Re:A deep dive into iOS Exploit chains found in the wild by mlyle on Friday August 30, 2019 @02:53AM (#20836442)
> 2FA makes it profoundly more difficult to compromise an account.

Just because the attacks are dumb.

If your computer is pwned, it should wait for you to 2FA, and then when you "log out"-- don't, do malicious stuff instead.

Re:A deep dive into iOS Exploit chains found in the wild by lxgr on Friday August 30, 2019 @07:16AM (#20837513)
That's why 2FA should be performed at transaction confirmation time for sensitive operations, not just at login or periodically.
Re:A deep dive into iOS Exploit chains found in the wild by mlyle on Friday August 30, 2019 @02:07PM (#20841006)
Even then; substitute the transaction they want for another transaction.

If the device you are using is compromised, you're in for a bad time.

You could send some simple transaction summary to the other device to acknowledge, which is getting better. Even so that doesn't completely eliminate the opportunity for tomfoolery.

Re:A deep dive into iOS Exploit chains found in the wild by pastage on Saturday August 31, 2019 @05:38AM (#20845414)
If you sign with a 2FA I can not see how a compromised computer can make that insecure. Though I will say, the UX on 2FA signing needs to get better, but it is secure enough.
Re:A deep dive into iOS Exploit chains found in the wild by mlyle on Saturday August 31, 2019 @12:40PM (#20847344)
If the 2FA doesn't contain the actual transaction detail, pretty simply.

When user tries to transfer $1,000 of cash from user's investment account to user's bank account, instead, initiate transferring $100,000 to EvilGuy's bank account. Rewrite elements so it appears that $1,000 is being transferred to user's bank account, and wait for user to receive their 2FA code and authenticate. This may be as easy as string replacement both ways.