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Re:QEMU VM Escape by bonzini on Monday August 26, 2019 @02:50AM (#20797936)
> anything valuable on the host is perfectly well accessible to QEMU

In a well configured KVM instance QEMU obeys the principle of least privilege as much as possible, that is it can only access the resources it needs to do its job.

In practical terms, this means QEMU is confined (via SELinux, cgroups, Unix permissions, seccomp) to only access resources for the VM it is running; taking over QEMU does not give you access to "anything valuable on the host".

Of course, having remote code execution in QEMU is awful; it can be a base for exploiting a kernel vulnerability to get root access. Luckily this bug would not be exploitable in a production setting.

Re:QEMU VM Escape by zurn on Monday August 26, 2019 @02:53AM (#20797941)
I think the intersection of conigurations where QEMU is using the SLiRP networking and where it's carefully configured to use the (non-default) sandboxing is pretty small. The sandboxing configs are typically associated with use of libvirt where you'll probably be using tun/tap or some other non-slirp kind of networking.
Re:QEMU VM Escape by bonzini on Monday August 26, 2019 @03:24AM (#20798034)
Exactly, this is why this bug is unlikely to be exploitable in production (OpenStack for example only runs QEMU via Libvirt).
Re:QEMU VM Escape by geofft on Monday August 26, 2019 @08:46AM (#20799376)
In a production system, it's highly unlikely that there is anything on the host besides the VM. You're not running qemu on one core and an unvirtualized database on another. Amazon is not running an S3 file server on the same physical machine that's being an EC2 host. The only valuable thing is other VMs.

And I think that there is no common configuration of OpenStack or libvirt that assigns unique access control labels per VM. Every qemu runs with the same privileges, ergo one exploited qemu can laterally attack another. (But maybe there's something nifty I'm missing?)

(Agree that for the use case of desktop virtualization, a good SELinux config can keep it from accessing your browser cookies.)

Re:QEMU VM Escape by mjg59 on Monday August 26, 2019 @09:21AM (#20799630)
SVirt will usually use a per-VM label that should inhibit direct lateral interaction.
Re:QEMU VM Escape by bonzini on Monday August 26, 2019 @12:42PM (#20801298)
FWIW, sVirt is the "code name" for Libvirt's SELinux labeling scheme. It uses SELinux multi-category security to ensure that each QEMU can only access resources destined to one VM.