Re:Security flaws caused by compiler optimizations
by atq2119 on Wednesday August 21, 2019 @01:29PM
(#20759315)
The leaking of sensitive data due to DCE'd memset is an interesting one. Generally, compilers are free to temporarily move data around to a lot of places, such as on the stack for register spilling. Is there any programming language at all which allows sensitive data to be annotated in such a way that the compiler will promise not to leak it to memory indefinitely in some sense? (E.g. all places that the data may be written to are cleaned up before reaching some sort of security boundary)
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Re:Security flaws caused by compiler optimizations
by nokcha on Wednesday August 21, 2019 @02:22PM
(#20759947)
>Is there any programming language at all which allows sensitive data to be annotated in such a way that the compiler will promise not to leak it to memory indefinitely in some sense?
Somewhat related: there's a recent paper that develops a language with syntax for marking data as secret; the compiler then goes even further and avoids timing side-channel leaks:
Cauligi, Sunjay, et al. "FaCT: A flexible, constant-time programming language." 2017 IEEE Cybersecurity Development (SecDev). IEEE, 2017. http://www.sysnet.ucsd.edu/~bjohanne/assets/papers/2017secde...