(I know that glueless delegations are common, I even use them myself. But Wikipedia’s delegation is not glueless. DJB does not like them: http://cr.yp.to/djbdns/notes.html)
; <<>> DiG 9.6.0-APPLE-P2 <<>> @a0.org.afilias-nst.info. wikipedia.org. ns +norecurs
; (1 server found)
;; global options: +cmd
;; Got answer:
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 51490
;; flags: qr; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 0, AUTHORITY: 3, ADDITIONAL: 3
;; QUESTION SECTION:
;wikipedia.org. IN NS
;; AUTHORITY SECTION:
wikipedia.org. 86400 IN NS ns2.wikimedia.org.
wikipedia.org. 86400 IN NS ns0.wikimedia.org.
wikipedia.org. 86400 IN NS ns1.wikimedia.org.
;; ADDITIONAL SECTION:
ns0.wikimedia.org. 86400 IN A 208.80.152.130
ns1.wikimedia.org. 86400 IN A 208.80.152.142
ns2.wikimedia.org. 86400 IN A 91.198.174.4
;; Query time: 46 msec
;; SERVER: 199.19.56.1#53(199.19.56.1)
;; WHEN: Thu Jan 6 10:05:40 2011
;; MSG SIZE rcvd: 143It's not the actual IP addresses for all the child data, like www.wikimedia.org.
DJB's basically saying "how can you say .org is signed when not every child in .org is signed". No delegated solution could ever offer that feature. If DJBCurve doesn't support signed and unsigned children, it's a thoroughly irrelevant technology that should be laughed out of the room.
Bashing DNSSEC for supporting a basic reality of delegated trust is flat out unfair.
I'm not an expert in this stuff, but I thought that getting "org" it's self signed was a massive achievement because it now means that domains beneath "org" can be signed?
If I do an A record lookup of "baddata-a.test.dnssec-tools.org" it returns NXDOMAIN on my system which supports DNSSEC, and 75.119.216.30 on my system which doesn't...
I'm not sure this is an argument against DNSSEC, it's more of an argument against DNSSEC's marketing. The DNSSEC folks like to say that DNSSEC is deployed to .org. Well, that's technically true, but since no .org domains are signed themselves, this claim is useless. DNSSEC provides no real security currently.
I watched DJB's talk and I thought the first half was mostly for entertainment, rather than detailed discussion of the weaknesses of DNSSEC.