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Re:Software Vulnerabilities in the Boeing 787 by service_bus on Friday August 16, 2019 @03:12PM (#20718613)
Unlike the security researcher, I do have access to multiple 787s as I am one of many people responsible for maintaining them.

I'm obviously not going to attempt to exploit the firmware on an aircraft for obvious reasons, but the security researcher's notion that you can "pivot" from the in flight entertainment to anything to do with aircraft operation is pure fantasy.

These systems are entirely separate, including the electricity that controls the systems.

This guy is preying on individuals' lack of knowledge about aircraft mechanics in order to promote himself.

Re:Software Vulnerabilities in the Boeing 787 by _kbh_ on Friday August 16, 2019 @08:20PM (#20720956)
If that is true, I am surprised that Boeing did not use that as a response to the researcher. Instead they responded that they have compiler mitigations in place and could not exploit the vulnerabilities themselves. That response makes me feel like the networks are not entirely seperate.

https://i.blackhat.com/USA-19/Wednesday/us-19-Santamarta-Arm...

page 52.

Re:Software Vulnerabilities in the Boeing 787 by jakeogh on Friday August 16, 2019 @04:11PM (#20719232)
Thank you for commenting about it.

There are _always_ bugs in software. Your assertion that it's pure fantasy to pivot from the flight entertainment system goes against there near infinite space of sidechannel attacks and demonstrated attacks on even airgapped systems; it's almost a law of physics that you are wrong.

The "self promotion" angle was brought up last time this was discussed: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=20657965 and it's an obviously pointless rebuttal.

Boeing: Please post the code. Lets read it. It's already out there: https://ioactive.com/arm-ida-and-cross-check-reversing-the-7...

Re:Software Vulnerabilities in the Boeing 787 by Hunisgung on Friday August 16, 2019 @04:18PM (#20719302)
> These systems are entirely separate, including the electricity that controls the systems.

This is not what Boeing said to the FAA 12 years ago when they asked to certify their network architecture

> The proposed architecture of the 787 is different from that of existing production (and retrofitted) airplanes. It allows connection to and access from external sources (the public Internet) and airline operator networks to the previously isolated Aircraft Control Domain and Airline Information Services Domain. The Aircraft Control Domain and the Airline Information Services Domain perform functions required for the safe operation of the airplane.

[1] http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library%5CrgSC.ns...

Re:Software Vulnerabilities in the Boeing 787 by Aloha on Friday August 16, 2019 @04:45PM (#20719515)
Nothing you've quoted here disagreed with what the statement from the parent
Re:Software Vulnerabilities in the Boeing 787 by Hunisgung on Friday August 16, 2019 @04:53PM (#20719588)
> It allows connection to and access from external sources (the public Internet) and airline operator networks to the previously isolated Aircraft Control Domain and Airline Information Services Domain.

I believe this contradicts the "systems are entirely separate" statement from the parent comment.

Re:Software Vulnerabilities in the Boeing 787 by Aloha on Friday August 16, 2019 @09:09PM (#20721229)
Nothing implies they are directly connected on the airplane however, which was my point
Re:Software Vulnerabilities in the Boeing 787 by auslander on Saturday August 17, 2019 @01:40AM (#20722324)
> previously isolated Aircraft Control Domain and Airline Information Services
Re:Software Vulnerabilities in the Boeing 787 by xemdetia on Friday August 16, 2019 @03:33PM (#20718848)
Would you say as someone who deals with these larger planes that at least the 787 current gen is closer to an older style chassis and body for cars? I have always imagined/assumed that 787's are not unique that they would be the same 'chassis' for a cargo plane or a passenger plane, and it really would have to do with how they fitted the plane for purpose?

This is part of the reason why I agree with you, because I don't see why the 787 would be unique by mixing avionics/mechatronics with the passenger systems but I don't know enough to say it with confidence. They would have designed the passenger systems to be independent and replaceable (especially with the knowledge gained from the legacies and upgrades of other planes like the 737).

Is there any public guides for 787 chassis and maintenance that you could point to as being reasonable things to read about this new style plane?

Re:Software Vulnerabilities in the Boeing 787 by WalterBright on Friday August 16, 2019 @04:00PM (#20719111)
Not sure what you mean, but aircraft stopped being "chassis and body" some time in the 1930's. That was the switch to a monocoque design with stressed skin.
Re:Software Vulnerabilities in the Boeing 787 by xemdetia on Friday August 16, 2019 @05:25PM (#20719865)
I couldn't find the right words to describe it, the other person who commented was a bit closer. At a certain point I would assume the Boeing 787 design would have interchangeable configurations that would not be dependent on the airframe and avionics. I wasn't sure if cabin, interior, model, or something else would best describe what I meant and chassis and body for a car was the best I could come up with that could describe these two changeable parts unlike the unibody chassis. It looks like configurations is the most appropriate word.

I was hoping that the person I commented to could point us at some fun manuals to describe how these configurations worked at a technical level.

Re:Software Vulnerabilities in the Boeing 787 by WalterBright on Friday August 16, 2019 @05:37PM (#20719964)
I don't know about the 787, but in my day (757) every airplane that rolled off the assembly line was different. For one thing, there was a lot of customization for each airline, and the airplanes underwent constant technical improvement from field experience.

Doing things, however, that increased the weight or changed aerodynamics of the airplane were a very big deal, causing a ripple effect that would be very expensive.

Freighter versions were commonplace, with the obvious omission of windows (weight savings) and interior fluff.

Doing a stretch, or a re-wing or re-engine is an enormous thing.

Re:Software Vulnerabilities in the Boeing 787 by close04 on Friday August 16, 2019 @04:11PM (#20719237)
They're more like the same airframe (fuselage, wings, undercarriage) with different fit an finish. Like different interior and possibly engines. The entertainment system is basically an add-on, it's separated both because it's not there in every configuration of the plane and also because it's supposed to be separated in order to be 100% sure that any failure there will not impact critical systems (like a short circuit, or an exploit). How exactly Boeing ensures this separation is another topic.
Re:Software Vulnerabilities in the Boeing 787 by pinko on Friday August 16, 2019 @03:48PM (#20718997)
That's valuable to know -- thanks -- but nevertheless, demonstrating that if you can get onto the avionics network you can trivially compromise it is still valuable, no? There may be discovered other ways to access the avionics network (besides the IFE) that no one realized, or thought to protect.
Re:Software Vulnerabilities in the Boeing 787 by nickpsecurity on Friday August 16, 2019 @09:17PM (#20721274)
When studying separation kernels, I remember that they were trying to safely/securely consolidate multiple systems (software and hardware) into fewer ones to save cost, size, energy, etc. Two things they were doing were separation kernels allowing lower-criticality stuff to be hosted with high-criticality and a special version of Ethernet (AFDX) that did something similar with provisions like reserving bandwidth.

So, you're saying there's no shared components at all... boards, data lines/switches, power lines/switches... between entertainment and critical systems? They run separate, highly-filtered power wires with separate boards with separate data lines for the two? No shared components at all?