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Re:Software Vulnerabilities in the Boeing 787 by p_l on Friday August 16, 2019 @01:03PM (#20717136)
There are three separate networks, with data diodes used for cases where information flows between them.

HW separation was enforced by FAA back when 787 was in prototype stage.

Re:Software Vulnerabilities in the Boeing 787 by jakeogh on Friday August 16, 2019 @04:16PM (#20719275)
Where can one read about the 787 data diodes?
Re:Software Vulnerabilities in the Boeing 787 by Hunisgung on Friday August 16, 2019 @04:28PM (#20719404)
You can read about the fact that there are NO data diodes on the FAA website

> The proposed architecture of the 787 allows connection to and access from external sources (the public Internet) and airline operator networks to the previously isolated Aircraft Control Domain and Airline Information Services Domain.

> Capability is proposed for providing electronic transmission of field-loadable software applications and databases to the aircraft. These would subsequently be loaded into systems within the Aircraft Control Domain and Airline Information Services Domain.

[1] http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library%5CrgSC.ns...

Re:Software Vulnerabilities in the Boeing 787 by p_l on Sunday August 18, 2019 @01:54PM (#20731714)
That's a request for comments from before 787 got its type certificate - I'd like to see the result, as I do recall there being a request to redesign the networks due to "not enough separation". Even HN talked about it.

I can't find the "work-in-progress" reports for type certification regarding the network, but the special conditions involve:

> The applicant shall ensure system security protection for > the Aircraft Control Domain and Airline Information > Domain from access by unauthorized sources external to > the airplane, including those possibly caused by > maintenance activity. The applicant shall ensure that > security threats are identified and assessed, and that > risk mitigation strategies are implemented to protect the > airplane from all adverse impacts on safety, > functionality, and continued airworthiness.