The point is that in reality you’re orders of magnitude more likely to be compromised by ads in your browser, an undetected flaw in legitimate code, or a compromised maintainer than GitHub having deployed custom infrastructure to target you. If you’re being target by a government, why would they do this instead of using the same TLS exploit to serve you a dodgy Chrome or OS update which is harder to detect and will work against 100% of targets?
How about this for a reason, where are the checksums when I’m curling and piping? How do I validate in an automated fashion the validity of this file I’m piping into an interpreter? When installing a package it’s quite easy to have redundant copies of an index with checksums pointing to a repository hosting the actual code. The attack surface is much smaller vs a curl | python
This is bad practice, stop promoting it or downplaying it’s security issues.
Edit: smaller instead of larger
> This is bad practice, stop promoting it or downplaying it’s security issues.
I’m trying to get you to do some security analysis focused on threats which are possible in this model but not the real alternatives (download and install, install from a registry like PyPI or NPM, etc.). So far we have “GitHub could choose to destroy their business”, which seems like an acceptable risk and about the same as “NPM could destroy their business”.
I am doing security analysis. If this file changes and I’m using it in built server images then I have no way of automatically validating the changes are good without doing the checksumming myself and managing this data. What we have is a server that can be hacked and the files are unable to be verified by checksum