good points. more on the subject:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G%C3%B6del%27s_incompleteness_t...
Minds and machines
Main article: Mechanism (philosophy)#Gödelian arguments
Authors including J. R. Lucas have debated what, if anything, Gödel's incompleteness theorems imply about human intelligence. Much of the debate centers on whether the human mind is equivalent to a Turing machine, or by the Church-Turing thesis, any finite machine at all. If it is, and if the machine is consistent, then Gödel's incompleteness theorems would apply to it.Hilary Putnam (1960) suggested that while Gödel's theorems cannot be applied to humans, since they make mistakes and are therefore inconsistent, it may be applied to the human faculty of science or mathematics in general. If we are to believe that it is consistent, then either we cannot prove its consistency, or it cannot be represented by a Turing machine.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mechanism_%28philosophy%29#G.C3...
There might be some rule which the uncertainty principle, the mind problem, and Godel's incompleteness fall out of, or that relates them eloquently and definitively at a higher order of abstraction, but they aren't the same.
I think there is a common kind of error equivocating the hard problem of consciousness (which is a formal way of understanding your "limit to what we can know in this aspect") with uncertainty principle or Godel's Incompleteness (another idea that looks like and is confused with the uncertainty principle or the hard problem of consciousness if you squint right). It is like recognizing y=2X^2 and y=2X^2+2 have the same derivative, but using this insight to argue that 2X^2=2X^2+2.