But unix domain sockets are not pipes, not least in the important way that you can reliably determine the identity of the other end. That can in some cases be an infoleak, and therefore needs independent access control.
If SCM_CRED passing were a real problem in _any_ scenario, SELinux should target that instead, not an entire subsystem on which half the system is built
To the end user, they only see your code broken by SELinux, and assume you haven't done your job. On the other hand, SELinux is codifying rules about UNIX that never existed and amount to emotional heuristics about the risk of Internet domain sockets being inherited around the system by the wrong process. The effect isn't to prevent Internet domain sockets being inherited by privileged processes, but breaking all sockets. That's garbage design, hidden behind marketing suggesting because the NSA contributed some code that the problem couldn't possibly be SELinux