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Re:Vickrey–Clarke–Groves Auction by Y_Y on Friday August 02, 2019 @02:29AM (#20591005)
Imagine a world where Google optimises for "social benefit" rather than revenue (as this algorithm does).
Re:Vickrey–Clarke–Groves Auction by debatem1 on Friday August 02, 2019 @02:40AM (#20591035)
This is a significant misreading of the phrase "social benefit" in the context of auction design.
Re:Vickrey–Clarke–Groves Auction by Footpost on Friday August 02, 2019 @05:16AM (#20591606)
Which of the many possible, highly contentious, and mututally incompatible notions of "social benefit" do you recommend Google adopt, and why?
Re:Vickrey–Clarke–Groves Auction by paulgb on Friday August 02, 2019 @05:52AM (#20591749)
There's a certain logic to using an "honest" mechanism even if it is not theoretically revenue optimal: non-honest mechanisms put the cost of optimizing bids on the buyers, which ultimately reduces the budget they could spend on ads. (The only honest mechanisms for this type of auction are not revenue-maximizing.)