> “The real crime here is that low-level retail bankers set up fake accounts in order to scam Wells Fargo out of their modest paychecks” just doesn’t work as a story of the scandal, even if there is a certain partial truth to it as a mechanical matter.
Meanwhile, the upper managers who put in place the incentives that guaranteed fraud would occur by low-level bankers are only guilty of "mismanagement":
> In the case of Wells Fargo, though, I suppose it’s possible that the attorney general thinks the shareholders really were the victims. They didn’t benefit from the fake accounts, and it is not crazy to say that they were harmed by Wells Fargo’s mismanagement.
Carrie Tolstedt took home tens of millions of dollars for inducing fraud, but only the scapegoats who did the dirty work for her are held morally culpable. The author doesn't even notice that just like those low-level retail bankers, Tolstedt scammed shareholders out of her (enormous) paycheck.
It's a perfect example of extending excessive empathy to executives while hypocritically withholding it from others.
And that is exactly what's happening in this thread. Executive malfeasance gets endlessly excused away as the product of poor incentives, because in your quest to humanize executives, you succumb to the perfectly natural human foible of "to know all is to forgive all".
Now, I'm not saying you're a mustache-twirling villain. But people who are unable to apply their principles when the chips are down and hold executives accountable are at the root of the problem.
Your comment again points to some perceived inability on my part to “hold executives accountable”, citing some flaw with my principles. I’d invite you to review the site guidelines and my comments: at no point have I suggested that the executives aren’t culpable in both the Boeing and Wells Fargo examples. You seem to be inferring that empathy is incompatible with judgement, and that misconception is basically the heart of what I’m trying to call attention to in this exchange.
Why is it a given that low-level retail bankers wanted faked accounts for the sake of their income, yet it is outside the realm of possibility that Carrie Tolstedt wanted faked accounts because they led to income for her — to the tune of tens of millions of dollars?
Why is it utterly inconceivable that Carrie Tolstedt is corrupt?
I guess we’ll have to agree to disagree about the strength of my principles.
- I believe that "understanding your enemy" ("Empathy") is absolutely positively crucial in successfully fighting your enemy
- This frequently gets interpreted as "Sympathizing with your enemy", being too soft, making excuses,etc; by those who want simple action.
So for example, I think we need to understand what makes a terrorist, how they come to their beliefs and motivations, and what we can do to prevent that. Others interpret that as being 'soft on terrorism', and we just need to 'bomb them into oblivion'; whereas I fear that while actual physical fighting is definitely a critical part of the overall campaign, there's a tremendous danger it'll just create more terrorists because we haven't eradicated the actual root source.
To me, striving to understanding an enemy doesn't prevent direct, firm action, if that is then convincingly found to be the most effective and efficient way of fighting them. In turn, I feel understanding your enemy prevents random, ineffective, emotionally-satisfying but results-lacking action. Others, of course, will disagree.
So - to the point of the article and discussion: I agree with op, if that is their intention, that you have to look at incentives; I've worked in corporate world for decades and I fully agree that you can have whatever value pledges, official goals, mission statements, and even official rules you darn well want to; and they're completely irrelevant if actual incentives, when summed out, reward a different behaviour. External and internal rules, and power, and statements, and goals, are all factors in incentives; as are the more subtle, emergent incentives. Going for a blunt approach may shift those incentives insufficiently far, or in an incorrect direction.
...My 2.4 Canadian Pennies :-D