There's a flaw in Kevin's argument: the odious measures don't actually reduce the chance of a plane going around to terrorism. In fact by diverting resources from more effective security measures (e.g. focusing on cargo) they actually increase the chance.

If you take a look at his article, he makes a few basic arguments that at least some of the measures are targeted at keeping explosives off of planes and seem reasonably sensible.

For example, take the shoe check. Richard Reid came pretty close to blowing up a plane, but for a flight delay (see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Richard_Reid_(shoe_bomber) ). He kind of prominently proved out an approach, and since the goal of the TSA is pretty obviously not having a plane blow up, they instituted a visible countermeasure to that approach.

So: I don't agree that every measure instituted by the TSA is completely ineffectual, at least in theory.

That being said, you do raise a good point about the allocation of resources. I have to admit having much less sense of what is and isn't being done on the cargo side, if only because I only experience air travel as a passenger.

Do you know much more about cargo security? What measures would you institute?

Bruce Schneier's got a pithy hard-to-argue with summary: "Cargo that is loaded on to passenger planes should be subjected to the same level of security as passenger luggage. Cargo that is loaded onto cargo planes should be treated no differently from cargo loaded into ships, trains, trucks, and the trunks of cars."

http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2010/10/cargo_security...

The US should act more like Israel: accept that acts of terrorism will happen, don't publicize it, just clean it up and quietly go after the bad guys. And, most of all, don't act terrified--just go about business as usual.

The kinds of terrorism that Israel accepts are small-scale things, like car bombs and suicide bombers on busses. This attitude is necessary because the hostile population lives right next door, or even within their borders. Its low-grade, low-tech and hard to prevent. The terrorists in Israel see themselves as foot soldiers trying to evict an occupying power.

Israelis accept terrorism because they have to, not because of some superior character.

This isn't the kind of terrorism that the US is trying to prevent. For a terrorist attack to be successful, it has to be high-profile, because terrorist activities in the US are primarily fund-raisers or propaganda events for organizations that otherwise operate closer to their homelands. This kind of big-bang events are not going to be easy to accept, or not publicize.

According to this view, an accepting attitude is not going to help the US with big-bang terrorism. If anything, it might help the terrorists.

If we really want to be more accepting of terrorism in Israeli style, we need to start having e.g. more car bombings in metropolitan areas. I'm not so sure that's really what anybody wants.

I have a hard time putting into words what I feel is wrong with your statement. I guess exceptionalism and arrogance could be the terms - there's been one terrorist attack in the US in recent history and somehow it seems that's the most important thing in the world? There's nothing to learn from people who've been dealing with it for decades (I won't endorse many Israeli policies but that's beside the point)? I'd say that you can't appreciate how continuous terrorist attacks make one feel but on the other hand the government sure has been trying its hardest to make people feel as if that really were the case.

Probably doesn't make sense but I can't let the statement stand and a downvote isn't the right thing here.

I guess you mean one successful attack? If the Detroit plane or Times Square car attacks had gone as planned, people would still be shitting bricks.