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Re:How not to sign a JSON object by deathanatos on Wednesday July 24, 2019 @09:36PM (#20521871)
How is the (attacker-controlled, no?) version & purpose field in PASETO not subject to the same issues as the JWT header? (Are we just lucky that none of the currently existing version/purposes can conflict?)

The issues folks have around JWT's header field always seem to be interface issues: libraries need to understand what keys they can use to validate, and what types those keys are, and validate them against the header.

(Though, I do not know why there is a "none" algo. That does seem like a folly. Could we recon that in the RFC?)

Re:How not to sign a JSON object by merlincorey on Sunday July 28, 2019 @12:57AM (#20545921)
I believe the distinction is that with PASETO, the versions are by specification not backwards compatible.

So, if my application supports v2 and you "forge" a v1 token, my application will not validate it.