Which just goes to show that this isn't actually about catching hardened criminals (who will just use non-backdoored encryption, either alone or layered on top of the compromised channels) but rather about enabling pervasive surveillance of ordinary citizens.
But yes, I think that there are lower-hanging fruits available for pick up here. I wish we lived in a reality where backdooring encryption was the best available path to reduce crime.
If what these criminals are doing is causing actual harm then there must be sufficient offline physical evidence to track and convict them by without direct access to their communications networks. Far from reducing crime, the enforcement of compulsory backdoors would itself be a crime committed by the government against its own citizens on a massive scale.
Isn't that exactly the Clipper Chip scheme? The arguments against it are as valid now as they were then. If you haven't seen them before, they can be found at the 1997 paper "The Risks of Key Recovery, Key Escrow, and Trusted Third-Party Encryption", and its 2015 followup "Keys Under Doormats: Mandating insecurity by requiring government access to all data and communications".
I don't like it as much as anyone else, but unfortunately I think this is viable in practice. Of course, nothing stops you, a hacker, from using non-backdoored encryption, but government is fine with that, as long as Google, Apple, Facebook etc. are forced to use backdoors.