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A comment on MITM on HTTPS traffic in Kazakhstan. Parent comment

Re:MITM on HTTPS traffic in Kazakhstan by cpach on Friday July 19, 2019 @05:51AM (#20477293)
”Any CA's added by the end user (aka person at the keyboard, or enterprise admins, etc) bypass pinning.”

But how would Chrome know if a root cert from Windows’ cert store was added by the user or not? They would all be located in the ”Trusted Root Certification Authorities” container.

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Re:MITM on HTTPS traffic in Kazakhstan by tialaramex on Friday July 19, 2019 @06:26AM (#20477420)
Yeah, no. This is Windows.

"The" Trusted Root Certification Authorities store isn't a real thing, it's just a view onto a bunch of different stores that are actually separate, including a local machine store and per-user stores plus of course stores added by your membership of a domain or other grouping.

So Chrome gets to distinguish between certificates that Microsoft added and the ones added by Group Policy or whatever else to your system.

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Re:MITM on HTTPS traffic in Kazakhstan by cpach on Friday July 19, 2019 @06:40AM (#20477473)
Oh! I should’ve known it was all stored in the registry. As you say, this is Windows after all. Found some MS docs that look relevant: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-gb/windows/win32/seccrypto/sys...
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