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Re:MITM on HTTPS traffic in Kazakhstan by LeifCarrotson on Thursday July 18, 2019 @02:13PM (#20472489)
> What Kazakhstan has done is create their own root certificate and asked people who live there to install it in their browsers.

Is this voluntary? If I bring a device into the country without this certificate (or if the local removes it from their machine) do things go back to normal?

Re:MITM on HTTPS traffic in Kazakhstan by jrockway on Thursday July 18, 2019 @02:21PM (#20472571)
If you don't have the special root certificate installed, the browser will refuse to connect because the certificate being presented is invalid (it's the government spying certificate, which you don't trust, not Facebook's certificate, which you do trust).
Re:MITM on HTTPS traffic in Kazakhstan by coldpie on Thursday July 18, 2019 @02:15PM (#20472507)
Your browser will reject the bogus FB certificate. You can tell your browser to connect anyway with the bogus cert, but it will still be MITM'd. There's no way around this (outside of using a VPN or whatever to effectively remove yourself from Kazakhstan).
Re:MITM on HTTPS traffic in Kazakhstan by filleokus on Thursday July 18, 2019 @02:19PM (#20472545)
Going back to normal, i.e the browser saying that the presented certificate is invalid, yes. But you will not be able to browse anything over a HTTPS connection. (Or do other stuff over PKI based TLS, i.e downloading software updates etc.)
Re:MITM on HTTPS traffic in Kazakhstan by coldpie on Thursday July 18, 2019 @02:21PM (#20472568)
Shoot, I hadn't even considered software updates. If this is installed at the system level, they could MITM any software update mechanism that doesn't use cert pinning, couldn't they? Woof.
Re:MITM on HTTPS traffic in Kazakhstan by filleokus on Thursday July 18, 2019 @02:55PM (#20472894)
Yep... I wonder how common it for "sensitive" software to neither use pinned certs nor some package level signing? But probably common enough that it can be abused...