Re:Vulnerabilities found in GE anesthesia machines
by ryacko on Thursday July 11, 2019 @08:04PM
(#20417026)
Could still be achieved through low data rate UDP with manual acknowledgements of sent data, with inbound data blocked.
Re:Vulnerabilities found in GE anesthesia machines
by Gibbon1 on Thursday July 11, 2019 @08:48PM
(#20417212)
I think it's a systems issue not really a software one. You need some sort of gap between the control unit (which can kill people) and the monitoring system which shouldn't be able to.
Would be perfectly reasonable to pass monitoring data from the control unit via a tx only channel to a networked monitoring device. For instance using a digital opto-coupler to galvanically isolate the two units.
Re:Vulnerabilities found in GE anesthesia machines
by ryacko on Friday July 12, 2019 @12:49PM
(#20422126)
I believe it would be cheaper, and thus more likely to be adopted if tx only was implemented in software, such as a iptable rule.
Hardware tx only would only make sense if you avoid side channels as well.
Anaesthesia machine control should be air-gapped.
Unfortunately, in the modern world of electronic medical records, we do need access to a stream of measurement data. Historically this has been obtained using one-way serial port data streams, which is probably safer than having a network stack accessible to the web.
The users (anaesthesiologists and hospital administrators) don’t understand these problems. (I’m an anaesthesiologist)