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Re:Vulnerabilities found in GE anesthesia machines by AnimalMuppet on Thursday July 11, 2019 @04:06PM (#20415258)
There's two problems with airgapping. First, how does the machine get updates? Do you mail a DVD to the anesthesia techs? Do they know how to install such a thing, or are they going to mess up the machine in the attempt? Or do you roll a service tech in a truck - to all the machines installed worldwide? (Yes, I know, if the alternative to rolling trucks is letting J Random Hacker play with your machine while it's keeping a patient alive, you'd better roll trucks. But updates are one reason why stuff winds up connected to the net rather than airgapped.)

The second reason why stuff is not airgapped is that it almost certainly connects to the hospital's patient records system. They have to keep a record of everything that happened until all potential lawsuits time out. Just in case there are complications from the surgery, they need all the records from the anesthesia machine uploaded after every use. So the anesthesia machine has to be on the same network as the patient records system - and so does every other medical device in the entire hospital. That network should be completely isolated from outside, but to do so, you have to airgap the network, not just one machine. Yes, it should be done, but that's harder to do, and harder to maintain.

For that matter, I've wondered, when you visit someone in the hospital, if you plug your laptop into the ethernet jack in their room and start looking around, what do you see?

Re:Vulnerabilities found in GE anesthesia machines by kazinator on Thursday July 11, 2019 @04:33PM (#20415538)
> First, how does the machine get updates?

Like every non-networked digital camera I've ever owned: put some fwupdate.bin file on a SD-card, plug it in and run some procedure on the device.

If a DVD are used, the techs can locally burn an .iso image onto a blank as an alternative to getting it in the mail.

Logs can also be gathered from the machine on removable media.

Medical records can be available via some non-airgapped laptop. Maybe something can be integrated into the machine, but the control of actual dangerous parameters for therapy or anaesthesia should be air-gapped. Manual entry only.

Operators can still be duped into entering malicious values manually, but at least there is a fighting chance for some oversight.

Re:Vulnerabilities found in GE anesthesia machines by Spooky23 on Thursday July 11, 2019 @07:59PM (#20416997)
So, by removing visibility, monitoring and discovery, you would improve oversight by having nurses transcribe data into machines and techs service them with manual USB keys?

Unless the IT team consists of Santa’s elves, that’s just not going to happen.

Re:Vulnerabilities found in GE anesthesia machines by gruez on Thursday July 11, 2019 @05:37PM (#20416121)
>[...] put some fwupdate.bin file on a SD-card, [...]

>[...] the techs can locally burn an .iso image onto a blank [...]

>Operators can still be duped into entering malicious values manually, but at least there is a fighting chance for some oversight.

or something like stuxnet.

Re:Vulnerabilities found in GE anesthesia machines by etimberg on Thursday July 11, 2019 @07:45PM (#20416918)
Send a field engineer around. These machines cost a lot of money, surely the cost of having someone come and perform updates wouldn't be crazy
Re:Vulnerabilities found in GE anesthesia machines by est31 on Thursday July 11, 2019 @04:30PM (#20415502)
The record keeping can be done via data diodes. As for the updates, they can be done by trained hospital staff, doesn't even have to be medical. Remote updates give the manufacturer remote killing abilities. Don't think that such power concentration is a good idea. For governments you kinda need it, but outside of them there is no need.
Re:Vulnerabilities found in GE anesthesia machines by craigsmansion on Thursday July 11, 2019 @06:03PM (#20416304)
> First, how does the machine get updates?

By eliminating updates. Why isn't software that runs on such machines proven correct? Yes, it's expensive, but medical equipment commands a premium price since it's supposed to meet stringent standards regardless. There's no reason to not up the standards for the software they run.

Re:Vulnerabilities found in GE anesthesia machines by AnimalMuppet on Thursday July 11, 2019 @07:06PM (#20416710)
Proven correct? No. It's extensively verified and validated, but that's not the same thing.

First, what are you going to prove? That it does what it's supposed to? No, because you have to have some formal definition of "what it's supposed to", and that can actually be wrong (see MCAS for an example - the software worked, the problem is that the spec was insane).

Second, as somebody (Donald Knuth?) said, it's amazing how many bugs there can be in proven-correct (or formally verified) software. Does your proof prove against all possible bugs? No. Against all possible security issues? Still no.

Third, even with those limitations, proven correct software is much harder (slower, and more expensive) to write, because the proof is really long. You want medical devices to have proven correct software? That would be nice. But we'd have maybe 2% of the medical devices that we have now, just because the proofs are so hard. That would be less nice. In particular, more people would die in that scenario from the absence of medical devices, than die in the existing scenario from bugs in them. That's less than helpful.

Re:Vulnerabilities found in GE anesthesia machines by craigsmansion on Friday July 12, 2019 @04:03AM (#20419082)
> That it does what it's supposed to?

and that is doesn't do what is not supposed to do.

As for your second point, if you could provide some background reading for that, I would appreciate it. I know of Knuth jokingly stating "Beware of bugs in the above code; I have only proved it correct, not tried it", but if he or someone else wrote a more serious paper on the occurrence of software errors in proved software, I would appreciate a link. A proof should prove against all software errors--if it doesn't I'm eager to learn more.

As for your third point: software errors are a solved problem, but as you noted, it's a hard (expensive) solution. The solutions also currently may limit functionality, so it's unfortunately not applicable everywhere, but some classes of software should warrant it.

In my view medical devices that can directly interact with a patient's physiology is one of them.

Re:Vulnerabilities found in GE anesthesia machines by AnimalMuppet on Friday July 12, 2019 @12:42PM (#20422055)
I don't have any links to offer. The best I can do is an argument. Here's a tool or method that lets you prove that there are no security holes. Now here comes someone who identifies a completely new class of exploits. Does the proof prove that the software is immune to the new class of exploit? Maybe - it depends on the details of the new class of exploit, and on the details of the proof.

So the proof that software is secure may be invalidated by new attacks. And this is (part of) why "proof against all software errors" is... let us say overly optimistic.

Even when it's not security issues... do you have a list of all possible software errors, so that you can prove that none of them occur? I don't. I'm not sure that anyone does. I suspect that there's always some kind of error that isn't covered.

Re:Vulnerabilities found in GE anesthesia machines by craigsmansion on Friday July 12, 2019 @02:00PM (#20422854)
Is suspect we're referring to different types of proof here. The sort of formal proof I refer to guarantees that the software will never display unspecified behaviour; your procedures are now backed by mathematical definitions with known properties.

It's not about security. It's about the software functioning correctly so no functional updates are necessary, diminishing the need for remote updates and all the security problems that bring along.

Even if remote access is needed to conveniently store various data in a different location there is no need to run everything on the same level. Smartphones are mass-produced computers that separate concerns with having a baseband and a main cpu. There is no reason a medical device could not have such a separation. One OS to keep the device working correctly under all circumstances, one OS to slap networking and interfacing on.

I don't expect the medical technology industry to change quickly, but as things are they are adopting bad practices of software development and moving in the wrong direction.

"If problems pop up, we'll update it later remotely" should not be an acceptable mindset for some classes of computer equipment.

Re:Vulnerabilities found in GE anesthesia machines by idbehold on Thursday July 11, 2019 @04:26PM (#20415460)
Both those problems are not my problem. I am perfectly fine with putting those problems on the hospitals and medical device manufacturers.
Re:Vulnerabilities found in GE anesthesia machines by Kalium on Thursday July 11, 2019 @04:53PM (#20415727)
Their solution has been connectivity.

What now?

Re:Vulnerabilities found in GE anesthesia machines by snlnspc on Thursday July 11, 2019 @05:00PM (#20415792)
The hospital's IT staff downloading and preparing update media, which would be the same process for every other device up until connectivity became their solution..
Re:Vulnerabilities found in GE anesthesia machines by Kalium on Thursday July 11, 2019 @06:57PM (#20416666)
It may be worth bearing in mind that historically, this often meant updates not going out at all.
Re:Vulnerabilities found in GE anesthesia machines by adrianN on Friday July 12, 2019 @01:37AM (#20418492)
Which is not that big of a deal if the updates aren't there to fix wormable holes. And in the area of safety, you can encourage people to update their machines by imposing dramatic fines for non-compliance.
Re:Vulnerabilities found in GE anesthesia machines by idbehold on Thursday July 11, 2019 @05:06PM (#20415848)
I think I've been pretty clear that it isn't my problem.
Re:Vulnerabilities found in GE anesthesia machines by seiferteric on Thursday July 11, 2019 @04:23PM (#20415422)
Hospitals have IT people.
Re:Vulnerabilities found in GE anesthesia machines by wl on Thursday July 11, 2019 @05:32PM (#20416065)
> They have to keep a record of everything that happened until all potential lawsuits time out.

More importantly, these records often have clinical significance.

Re:Vulnerabilities found in GE anesthesia machines by sdinsn on Thursday July 11, 2019 @04:43PM (#20415636)
> Do you mail a DVD to the anesthesia techs? Do they know how to install such a thing

That sounds like an easy solution to me. God forbid people need to learn something new for their job.