the RiskIQ article identifies the location of the script as "the main website"
additionally, I'm not sure how this would solve the problem. If BA went to all the effort of putting their frontend assets on a CDN, why wouldn't their HTML, with the hashes also be on the CDN? and if the hashes are not generated by the CDN, how does the server generate the hashes without being affected by changes on the CDN? regardless of outcome, if the process is automated, does a human being need to read a diff every time any file on any CDN changes? Can't an attacker then just wait until the hashes are automatically updated?
Most likely the origin server had a hardcoded reference to the CMS path(https://www.britishairways.com/cms/global/scripts/lib/modern...) and if that had been done as
<script type="text/javascript" src="https://www.britishairways.com/cms/global/scripts/lib/modernizr-2.6.2.min.js" integrity="sha384-5XrDTQbmmgpJKmfKW8outDDdYpRCnIf+nxX2nVR10NyWby6pPcujAELgWVmCu2P/"></script>
I speculate the attack would not have been successful. For an extremely static resource like this it wouldn't have been complex to adopt SRI.
So I would assert that SRI would have stopped both these attacks.