Nevertheless, the provided checklist did work as evidenced by Lion Air 043.
It is quite possible that it would have been an adequate checklist when backed up with sufficient training that emphasized the differences between MCAS-induced trim runaway and that which might have been experienced in other variants. Simulator practice of manually trimming might help as well, though there is some doubt whether current simulators can adequately model the difficulties that may be experienced.
Also, that "checklist", and he existence of MCAS, was not even commonly known until after Lion Air went down.
The secrecy behind this is largely attributed to Boeing trying to keep MCAS from intense scrutiny by the FAA, based on whistleblower testimony reported in the 60 Minutes Expose.
https://m.youtube.com/watch%3Fv%3DaO7_indbfME&ved=2ahUKEwiPp...
I have seen some suggestions that this was also the reason for not having MCAS compare the two AofA sources to detect a fault, as the fault would have to be reported, and the documentation of that indicator would reveal the existence of MCAS.