The excessive force on the trim required in the Ethiopian Air case was a consequence of the crew leaving the engines at high power, the trim having run farther nose down, and the elevator being held nose up, resulting in loading the horizontal stabilizer thus making the trim difficult to move. (Though I'm critical of their decision to restore and leave power to the trim system without commanding aircraft-nose-up after correctly diagnosing runaway trim, I don't really fault them for leaving excessive power in. That's a reasonable response to the initial indications and by the later time they realized it was a trim issue, they were pretty well loaded up struggling with the airplane that was well out of trim, so undoing their thrust command [which would typically result in a descent that they didn't want/couldn't afford] probably isn't reasonable to expect.)
From an armchair perspective a checklist for AoA sensor failure would have been required for the flight to end safely (maybe with "cutoff stab trim" on the list).
That means it was dumb luck (a third person being there) and not due to following procedures if those procedures are nearly impossible to follow, or require superhuman strength.