Re:The privacy of the TLS 1.3 protocol [pdf]
by jrockway on Thursday July 04, 2019 @08:35AM
(#20353989)
I'm just saying, it's outside the scope of TLS to fix this problem. Map tiles are different sizes because it makes the page load faster and costs less money to run the service and uses less data on your mobile plan. You CAN prevent this attack, but it's too expensive and nobody cares. TLS is a comfortable medium; adding additional security, while not adding too much additional cost.
This is absolutely not an "obscure" attack: it has been used, successfully, to build a tool to guess what city you are looking at with Google Maps. There, tiles are downloaded to render a map (similar to the segments used to render a video on YouTube). While each tile may have a fixed dimension, again, due to image compression, each tile has a different file size. Since tiles are downloaded in clusters, you can pretty readily fingerprint different regions of the map a user is looking at (and if it weren't for local caching, it would work almost instantly 100% of the time, live).
With type-ahead searching, as each character you type returns a different list, given the file size response sequence you should be able to determine exactly what search query someone made with almost total accuracy almost all of the time when they type it, with the only reason it ever not working well being due to caches and delayed queries (if you type fast enough on many type-ahead query boxes it will avoid sending queries for the prefixes, to reduce load for something that by the time the result is fetched won't even render).