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Re:The privacy of the TLS 1.3 protocol [pdf] by 3xblah on Wednesday July 03, 2019 @08:43PM (#20350512)
When I saw the title of the paper I expected it would be about what the parent comment describes. Instead, they deliberately omit the case of SNI and state that this issue "deserves its own paper".

I think any serious consideration of the issue cannot proceed on the assumption that the SNI extension is a "must-have". It is optional. Users can prefer websites that do not use SNI. There are still plenty of TLS-protected websites not using CDNs and SNI.

CDNs often do not check the Host header against the SNI name.

For example, request a page from www.globalsign.com from host marketcircle.com.

   echo -e "GET /en/ HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: www.globalsign.com\r\nConnection: close\r\n\r\n"|openssl s_client -no_tls1 -no_tls1_1 -no_ssl2 -no_ssl3 -ign_eof -no_ticket -host marketcircle.com -port 443 -tlsextdebug -servername marketcircle.com -verify 9
Re:The privacy of the TLS 1.3 protocol [pdf] by brians on Wednesday July 03, 2019 @10:00PM (#20350879)
This is a tricky question to turn off. It’s rarely clear how to construct an attack with it, and it does allow a kind of privacy by telling your ISP & DNS providers one name, while asking for another.