News for hackers. Stuff that matters.
Re:Theo de Raadt summarizes the OpenBSD IPSec "backdoor" sit... by djmdjm on Tuesday December 21, 2010 @06:27PM (#2029827)
Actually SSH2 still uses CBC in the vulnerable manner described, since fixing this would require a protocol change. The risk is low because, as you observe, it's not a very practical attack.

In OpenSSH we increased the frequency of rekeying to make it even less feasible. More recently as a result of the CBC attacks found by the researchers at Royal Holloway (http://www.openssh.org/txt/cbc.adv) we switched to preferring CTR mode ciphers (and RC4) which are immune to both these attacks.

Re:Theo de Raadt summarizes the OpenBSD IPSec "backdoor" sit... by tptacek on Tuesday December 21, 2010 @10:25PM (#2030465)
I don't doubt that OpenSSH is immune to this attack, but in general CTR nonces are just as tricky to get right as CBC IVs, and when you get a CTR nonce wrong the whole cipher blows up. Smarter people than me disagree with me when I say this, but if you're a casual crypto protocol person, CBC is the safer choice.