Re:Schneier's take on the alleged backdoor in OpenBSD
by 16s on Friday December 17, 2010 @04:39PM
(#2017923)
He's just pointing out that a big project will have bugs and he's right. That's not a matter of opinion. Not much fuzz testing has been done on OpenBSD since the early 2000s. When Theo did fuzz test back then, he found bugs. He claims to have found two just now while doing the audit in the crypto code. Code has bugs. Large projects have many bugs.
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Re:Schneier's take on the alleged backdoor in OpenBSD
by tptacek on Friday December 17, 2010 @07:10PM
(#2018408)
In the early 2000's I was still speaking to Theo, and I don't believe that during that time period he ever did systemic fuzz testing on OpenBSD. SPIKE wasn't even released until 2002.
Also: while we use fuzzers to probe for specific kinds of crypto flaws, the kind of fuzzing being done then (and for the most part today) does not identify crypto flaws.
We are, let's be clear, talking about a project that appears to have managed to ship IPSEC code that didn't verify packet authenticators for something like a year.
Re:Schneier's take on the alleged backdoor in OpenBSD
by 16s on Friday December 17, 2010 @07:12PM
(#2018415)
Here is what he said about his fuzz testing in 2000:
Re:Schneier's take on the alleged backdoor in OpenBSD
by tptacek on Friday December 17, 2010 @07:16PM
(#2018425)
He's talking about the academic research project fuzzing was named for. All it did was fuzz command line arguments.
Re:Schneier's take on the alleged backdoor in OpenBSD
by ShabbyDoo on Friday December 17, 2010 @05:12PM
(#2018067)
Or pointing out how hard it would be to get a "bug" inserted into such a codebase. He's not saying that either endeavor is easy. His only point was that, given a budget of $X and an embarrassment cost of (abstract) $Y for getting caught attempting to degrade the security of OpenBSD [my interpretation of "risky"], spending those $X on the identification of existing exploits would be the more rational course of action.