I, as a sysadmin, have been helped by (ZFS) checksums multiple times. This includes times where I had to go to tape manually because the really expensive SAN has said "everything is fine" when it wasn't.
So telling me "checksums do not help" is contrary to my life experience.
You seem to be saying "checksums don't matter because there may be nothing we can do about about the corrupted data". So we should just blindly accept all the bits from the lower levels of the stack? We should do nothing to verify that those levels of the stack are working correctly?
You've mentioned application-level checksumming: yes, that would be good. But until every single dev adds code to checksum (and correct?) their data structures and file formats, having more checksums allows for beter information about when corruption occurs IMHO.
So why does it seem you are agruing against checksums?
It doesn't actually. It introduces inconsistencies unless on first detected corruption your filesystem stops all reads and writes until you recover corrupted block from backup and you might not even have it in backup, because backup is not synchronous replication.
> Checksums allow you do know that there is a problem in the first place. If you don't know there's a problem, how can you invoke "recovery mechanisms", automatic or otherwise?
You do your own appropriate checksumming suitable for recovery mechanism that you have. It's hardly as primitive as you think, because you have to respond fast, without corruption, transparently on request, you also have to schedule a check whether you actually need to heal anything, maybe it was a transient error, then mark it as corrupted, find what to resync from where, all of which also has to be fast, which means a bit complicated algorithms with sort of checksum databases on each replica, etc.