Boeing Knew the AOA Disagree Alert on the 737 Max Didn’t Work

Re:Boeing Knew the AOA Disagree Alert on the 737 Max Didn’t ... by aaronbrethorst on Monday June 10, 2019 @02:26AM (#20144344)

"Senior company leadership was not involved in the review and first became aware of this issue in the aftermath of the Lion Air accident."

i.e. the buck stops somewhere else!

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Re:Boeing Knew the AOA Disagree Alert on the 737 Max Didn’t ... by raverbashing on Monday June 10, 2019 @02:53AM (#20144460)

And the damning thing was that they still thought it was ok to keep it absent

There are a couple of reasons why "the existing functionality was acceptable" is a poor excuse:

- It was present on early models (it was not an optional feature)

- Its triggering indicate to the pilots that something is amiss. Especially after the 1st accident there should have been an association "AOA problems -> potential MCAS problems"

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Re:Boeing Knew the AOA Disagree Alert on the 737 Max Didn’t ... by seren on Monday June 10, 2019 @03:37AM (#20144620)

It is possible to not be in a review or aware and still be responsible if you instill a culture of fear and instruct your team that the plane should keep flying whatever the means.

I don't have any information whatsoever to say it happened at Boeing, but saying you were not aware is sometimes not enough.

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Re:Boeing Knew the AOA Disagree Alert on the 737 Max Didn’t ... by pauljurczak on Monday June 10, 2019 @02:49AM (#20144445)

Scapegoating begins...

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