Thank you!
pycrypto is terrible. The pycryptodome fork fixes most problems in it.
Also, maybe worth sharing you are listed as fourth contributor [1] to the cryptography library, and your web book is prominent on the project homepage, so this piece of opinion may be biased.
>> Concrete suggestion: use Fernet
Please don't. Don't use boutique protocols with informal specs and without test vectors generated by a sufficient number of independent implementations. Stick to RFC-backed protocols. Use JWT with rigid parameters. Even other cryptography author states that just supporting JWT and not Fernet would have been better [2].
[1] https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/blob/master/AUTHORS.rst
[0]: https://github.com/Legrandin/pycryptodome/commit/8675e6f03fc... [1]: https://github.com/Legrandin/pycryptodome/commit/87c2d6aedb3...
The number of cryptographers willing to do hours and hours of free, often thankless, open source work is pretty small, so no, I'm also not going to write up a disclaimer every time I tell someone to use a library. Of course I'm going to work on the projects that I think are doing the right thing.
If the length of the token was important, and you wanted to issue the shortest possible (yet secure) token: what would you recommend? I looked at Fernet but the ciphered text is... massive.
Any kind of encryption is going to make the ctext be effectively random bits, and is going to add a MAC tag that's some number of bits wide, and introduce some randomization (IV or nonce). You can tweak the size of some of those, but I feel the biggest cost you're paying is probably the b64 encoding.
What are you encapsulating this thing in? An HTTP response?
Some critique of the crypto bits, since I'm a crypto person.
1. Do you actually need asymmetric cryptography for this? It seems like at some point the proxy has full authority, and it could just encrypt the token for you symmetrically? (This is valuable because symmetric crypto is a lot less precarious than asymmetric crypto, see next point)
2. Please don't use PKCS1v15 padding for encryption in new systems. It's been known to be busted for about 20 years now. We have workarounds, and they may well be deployed in the exact context you're using it. But they keep breaking, because we just have them to keep the infinite amount of already-deployed software running, not because we think it's fundamentally fixable. This is also the textbook example of a vulnerable service: one that takes ciphertexts and decrypts them on demand. With PKCSv15, I can modify the ciphertext so that _the way you treat the modified ciphertext_ tells me something about how to make private key operations. And in this setup, that means I get the real token, so that sounds bad. The good news is that you've successfully designed around it by adding a signature, so I don't think it's mountable... but. Please, no more PKCS1v15 :-(
3. It feels a little awkward to use JWT for the outside signature but not the inside encryption. But less JWT is a good thing :)
Concrete suggestion: use Fernet (you're already using pyca/cryptography) or libsodium's secretbox and then all of the crypto problems go away. You keep the security engineering dilemma of stateful v stateless proxy (do I want the real token in the proxy at all?) -- but that's another argument.