Having somebody else do this for you makes some sense, but again it makes sense as part of a whole system dashboard, you care if your site gives 404s to everyone outside the VPN as well.
Bad guys _mostly_ don't start by getting illegitimate certs issued. For the DNS hijack stuff for example, even where a cert was issued we see it significantly _after_ the traces of the hijack are visible. The bad guys lie in DNS and _then_ they might get themselves certs so they can run an HTTPS site, you ideally want to detect the DNS hijack as otherwise you're already playing catchup before the first pager alert happens, and these attacks may last just hours or even minutes, so every second counts.
Without DNS hijack, they're mostly doing phishing, so you won't see new certs for your site, because you know you're legitimate.site.example and not legit-site.example or login-legit.badguys.example. Your customers, alas, not so much.
It used to be that spoofed WiFi and SSL-strip (a program that terminates all HTTPS connections and forwards them as HTTP) would work pretty well for that. These days HSTS should stop most of that.
HSTS has been adopted by the big ones, (e.g. gmail, paypal, lastpass). I'd say these are also the ones where it might work out to drop a pineapple in some NYC coffeeshops. It isn't widely deployed though, so it'll still do some damage. I guess criminals don't wanna do the sleuthing to figure out where they found creds.
It seems like it works by intercepting traffic and downgrading the attacked machine's connections to http. So, your text is correct; it is terminating the https connection "the other way 'round" from the way I first read your text. It's https from the MITM machine to the "real" server, but http from the browser to the MITM machine, rather than the MITM machine being able to terminate the https session from the browser (without a cert error).
Sharing in case that helps someone else not have to google for "hey, I don't think that will work the way it's described".