edit after your reply: if you install in /tmp, you'll end up with /tmp/bin/dstat and /tmp/share/dstat. you're concerned that an attacker could smuggle something into /tmp/share/dstat, but /tmp/bin/dstat is of no worry? what exactly is the threat here?
> access control of `../share` in an unknown part of the filesystem is a matter for some concern. Given that the binary can be put basically anywhere, it would seem to be perilously close to CWD.
another edit since i cannot reply to you: do you have any examples of the "threat model [which] includes that you can't trust every part of the filesystem you're working from"? something concrete, specific. a particular install prefix that would let you create $prefix/bin/dstat but $prefix/share/dstat would be dangerous.
aaand, see my reply at https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=19989237
EDIT: A sibling points out the issue in more detail - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=19989237
The only bug in this PR that I can see is it might assume the system plugins are more important than the local overrides. Generally you’d put this sort of path in the least priority, to allow for /usr/local to override. That said, obviously hard-coding paths is worse than simply having a default, presumably relative to the current binary/file, and allowing end users and packagers to override/configure the defaults to suit their security preferences, with the default being that the entire package is unzipped with expected relative paths to files... or that’s how I would look at it. The only way to greater security would be to ship a Docker container, Snap package, or similar and mount your own filesystem overlays. :) Or, perhaps keeping a trusted list of plugins somewhere.