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Re:ZombieLoad: Cross Privilege-Boundary Data Leakage on Inte... by nine_k on Wednesday May 15, 2019 @03:43PM (#19922989)
Let's dissect.

- Same OS, server: you likely control all the processes in it anyway, no untrusted code.

- Different OSes in different VMs, server: they likely run different versions of Linux kernel, libc, and shared libraries anyway. They don't share the page caches for code they load from disk.

- Browser with multiple tabs, consumer device: likely they might share common JS library code on the browser cache level. The untrusted code must not be native anyway, and won't load native shared libraries from disk.

- Running untrusted native code on a consumer device: well, all bets are off if you run it under your own account; loading another copy of msvcrt.dll code is inconsequential compared to the threat of it being a trojan or a virus. If you fire up a VM, see above.

Re:ZombieLoad: Cross Privilege-Boundary Data Leakage on Inte... by dfrage on Wednesday May 15, 2019 @04:47PM (#19923613)
There's also Same OS, operating system level virtualization, like Docker, it's the less expensive default for https://www.ramnode.com/vps.php for example. Not at all familiar with this technology, but scanning Wikipedia if you used Docker would the libcontainer library be shared between container instances?
Re:ZombieLoad: Cross Privilege-Boundary Data Leakage on Inte... by nine_k on Wednesday May 15, 2019 @06:50PM (#19924562)
Likely it would be. But really Docker is more about convenience of deployment and (much) less about security. I would not run seriously untrusted code in merely a (Docker) container; I don't know much about the isolation guarantees of OpenVZ.

In any case, containers share OS kernel, OS page cache, etc. This can be beneficial even for a shared hosting as a way to offer a wide range of preinstalled software as ro-mounted into the container's file tree. Likely code pages of software started this way would also be shared.