My main issue with that definition is what makes it a useful prediction. Does a theory (for particle physics) that predicts the Higgs Boson more useful than one that didn't? If not, then before we collected the data to reject other theories they all would have been equal.
I would rather suggest that the properties of a good theory are best fitting existing data and having specific predictions for future measurements.
> Falsifiability, in this perspective, isn't a requirement in and of itself - it's a natural consequence of the requirement that theories be useful.
If you are of the opinion that any good theory is falsifiable (in the sense described in the article), then presumably you disagree with the rejection of falsifiability in the article. Where would you say the error in logic in the article is?
> Suppose that, contrary to what actually happened, Cavendish’s experiment had yielded a result that was qualitatively incompatible with the law of universal gravitation. The reaction of physicists would certainly not have been to reject Newton’s theory of gravitation and start looking for another one.
Looking for another theory is precisely what physicists do, once experimental error, miscalculation, and misunderstanding the theory are ruled out. Hence relativity and quantum physics, and the current search for a theory that explains dark matter and dark energy.
And another:
> From a purely logical point of view, what scientists do when they blame the failure of a prediction on the background assumptions instead of theory they take to be well-established is no different from what charlatans peddling pseudoscience do...
This is arguing that "falsificationism" requires discarding a theory after a single failed experiment, but forgets that even experiments can be falsified (by finding an error in the experiment or the associated conclusions).
The difference between scientists and "charlatans peddling pseudoscience" is that when a prediction proves to be false, scientists look for an explanation.
The author forgets that the explanation might be found in the experiment or the prediction, and scientists look there first before questioning a theory that's proven itself in the past.
And I would say that Newtonian gravity was a useful theory despite not matching experimental currently because when it was the best it mostly explained observations.
"Useful" in this context means useful for a future theory or experimentation, not utility. Newtonian theory certainly predicted many results, and all of them were useful in the above sense. A prediction doesn't have to exactly match observations to be useful, but that the theory produces a prediction which _could_ be tested against.
Even flat-earth theory makes useful predictions - albeit already proven false as time and time again, it predicts the wrong results.
What isn't useful is an unfalsifiable theory, which means the predictions it makes is not able to be tested, or the results of such a test could be construed to match if you squint a bit. A theory like creationism, for example.
> Even flat-earth theory makes useful predictions - albeit already proven false as time and time again, it predicts the wrong results.
I definitely agree usefulness is independent of fitting experimental data. gliop would seem to say flat earth theories are not useful.
Only better answers than "Because God decreed it." were known and handled, by philosophers and early scientists, even by thelogicians, since antiquity.
And there were tons of nuanced epistemologies (that included practical falsifiability) by the time Popper came up with his idea already.
That's not the purpose of the article, though. The purpose is to show that the most popular purported solution to the problem (naive falsificationism) is so severely limited as to be untenable, and that's really useful in itself. The title is "Why falsificationism is false", not "What should replace falsificationism".
I imagine a big appeal of falsifiability in its early days, stemmed from its opposition to religious dogma. Imagine dealing with someone whose answer to every question comes back to God. "Why did the patient die?" "Because God decreed it." Talking about germ-theory must have been a massive improvement over theology, hence why ideas like falsifiability must have arisen to provoke people to think in more critical ways.
My own standard for evaluating theories comes down to the following: The simplest explanation that best fits existing data, and makes useful predictions for the future.
"Simplest" because we need to prevent overfitting.
"Fits existing data" because the whole point of a theory is to explain what we see around us.
And "useful predictions" because it will actually provide practical benefit to us. As opposed to a theory like "God decreed it", which may be extremely simple and error-free, but provides us with no practical benefit at all.
As I see it, falsifiability is a side-effect of the second and third requirements. If a theory is making useful predictions, we might as well check to see if it's accurate. And if it's not, there's no point in holding on to a theory that's making faulty predictions. Falsifiability, in this perspective, isn't a requirement in and of itself - it's a natural consequence of the requirement that theories be useful and fit any data at hand.