Re:Were atoms real? (Interesting discussion of scientific ph...
by lmkg on Thursday December 09, 2010 @05:00PM
(#1989380)
I think you can take this one step further and talk about models that are actually false, but nonetheless work. Perhaps the best example would be calculus, which treats space as continuous, and in that sense is the polar opposite of the model of atoms. We now know that space is discretized (at the Plank-length scale, ~10^-36ish meters), but calculus nonetheless remains a remarkably effective and efficient model for making testable and verifiable predictions about mechanics (which itself is false but useful). So calculus is an example of the sort of "pedagogical device" that the 1860's philosophers were debating.
The takeaway from this is that models need not be based firmly in reality to be useful, and conversely that models that are useful and make correct predictions may still nonetheless be based on false descriptions. My favorite example of the latter is Lorentz transforms, which the author alluded to in the article. The math behind changing frames of reference in special relativity predates relativity itself, and were actually developed as a mathematical model of the now-defunct theory of "ether," the posited medium that light waves must move through and which happened to magically distort space with some sort of drag force. Despite the fact that its theoretical bases was completely false, Lorentz' (Lorentz's?) work nonetheless was an accurate model, and could be translated whole into a totally different theoretical framework.
Whether that new theoretical framework is accurate (i.e. "real") or not is hard to tell. It seems to be holding up to advanced scrutiny so far, but that's not a sure indicator.
Re:Were atoms real? (Interesting discussion of scientific ph...
by jules on Thursday December 09, 2010 @05:47PM
(#1989576)
> We now know that space is discretized
We do not. That is merely the case in some controversial quantum gravity theories.
However, I can give another example. In electrodynamics, you often treat a bulk charge as a continuous charge density (for example a charged sphere) rather than a large discrete set of point charges. This is because then you can apply calculus, which makes computations feasible.
Re:Were atoms real? (Interesting discussion of scientific ph...
by vilhelm_s on Thursday December 09, 2010 @06:34PM
(#1989767)
It is said that Poincaré, when finally convinced that the evidence of atoms was overwhelming, exclaimed something like "but then it's all false!", meaning that all the continuum-based theories like fluid dynamics and electrodynamics, which had previously seemed like exact descriptions of the underlying reality, had suddenly shown themselves to be mere approximations...
Re:Were atoms real? (Interesting discussion of scientific ph...
by dkarl on Thursday December 09, 2010 @06:04PM
(#1989648)
The takeaway from this is that models need not be based firmly in reality to be useful
What, then, is the criterion for being "based in reality?" Isn't it safe to assume that the theories that say space is discretized are also false in some way?
Also, a minor but important quibble: calculus itself is not a physical theory.
Re:Were atoms real? (Interesting discussion of scientific ph...
by baddox on Friday December 10, 2010 @12:22AM
(#1990740)
Calculus itself is rather geometrical. A definite integral is the area under a curve on a 2d graph of the real numbers, and the real numbers certainly are continuous. Obviously one can argue (and many do) about the relation between mathematics and the real world.
Re:Were atoms real? (Interesting discussion of scientific ph...
by pjscott on Thursday December 09, 2010 @06:23PM
(#1989723)
This article kind of is a trap, actually. Check out the last paragraph:
> It seems that one disguised empirical question scientists are asking, when they ask “Is X real, or just a handy predictive device?” is the question: “will I still get accurate predictions, when I use X in a less circumscribed or compartmentalized manner?” (E.g., “will I get accurate predictions, when I use atoms to predict quantized charge on tiny oil drops, instead of using atoms only to predict the ratios in which macroscopic quantities combine?".
Rather than trying to answer the question, the author turns it into a slightly different one that's easier to answer, and potentially more useful.
Re:Were atoms real? (Interesting discussion of scientific ph...
by grovulent on Thursday December 09, 2010 @06:36PM
(#1989775)
Yeah theorists have been doing this since Plato. They can't understand the question they've asked so they try to re-parse it into one that they can.
I'm not sure why - but it rarely occurs to them to just stop asking the first question, and stop asking whether the second actually has the same semantic content as the first. When I point this out to them they retort that I have no rational argument that could reasonably compel them to accept that these questions can't be answered. I accept the truth of this retort. However, I offer them the prediction that animals that tend toward behaviours such as theirs will get selected out of existence a whole lot sooner than those that don't. It's a purely empirical hypothesis so there is nothing more that can be said on the matter - and so it mercifully ends the conversation.
Re:Were atoms real? (Interesting discussion of scientific ph...
by alphaBetaGamma on Thursday December 09, 2010 @06:26PM
(#1989737)
I disagree, you can push quantum physics very hard, in weird corners where is is manifestly wrong. Then you do the experiments, surprise surprise, quantum mechanics turn out to be right. E.g. Single Photon Interference
The takeaway from this is that models need not be based firmly in reality to be useful, and conversely that models that are useful and make correct predictions may still nonetheless be based on false descriptions. My favorite example of the latter is Lorentz transforms, which the author alluded to in the article. The math behind changing frames of reference in special relativity predates relativity itself, and were actually developed as a mathematical model of the now-defunct theory of "ether," the posited medium that light waves must move through and which happened to magically distort space with some sort of drag force. Despite the fact that its theoretical bases was completely false, Lorentz' (Lorentz's?) work nonetheless was an accurate model, and could be translated whole into a totally different theoretical framework.
Whether that new theoretical framework is accurate (i.e. "real") or not is hard to tell. It seems to be holding up to advanced scrutiny so far, but that's not a sure indicator.
We do not. That is merely the case in some controversial quantum gravity theories.
However, I can give another example. In electrodynamics, you often treat a bulk charge as a continuous charge density (for example a charged sphere) rather than a large discrete set of point charges. This is because then you can apply calculus, which makes computations feasible.
False, but true enough when you are building a bridge.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vasco_da_Gama_Bridge
What, then, is the criterion for being "based in reality?" Isn't it safe to assume that the theories that say space is discretized are also false in some way?
Also, a minor but important quibble: calculus itself is not a physical theory.
Don't read this article... don't think about the question... Don't go near it!
I can't remember exactly why though. However, I did see admiral ackbar around here somewhere - I think he knows.
> It seems that one disguised empirical question scientists are asking, when they ask “Is X real, or just a handy predictive device?” is the question: “will I still get accurate predictions, when I use X in a less circumscribed or compartmentalized manner?” (E.g., “will I get accurate predictions, when I use atoms to predict quantized charge on tiny oil drops, instead of using atoms only to predict the ratios in which macroscopic quantities combine?".
Rather than trying to answer the question, the author turns it into a slightly different one that's easier to answer, and potentially more useful.
I'm not sure why - but it rarely occurs to them to just stop asking the first question, and stop asking whether the second actually has the same semantic content as the first. When I point this out to them they retort that I have no rational argument that could reasonably compel them to accept that these questions can't be answered. I accept the truth of this retort. However, I offer them the prediction that animals that tend toward behaviours such as theirs will get selected out of existence a whole lot sooner than those that don't. It's a purely empirical hypothesis so there is nothing more that can be said on the matter - and so it mercifully ends the conversation.
(Sorry, couldn't resist)
"Although the world may be a dream, I would call that dream real enough if, using reason well, I was never deceived by it"
Just don't start interpreting that monster. There be dragons.