It could just as well been signed today with a fake date.
The traditional option (used by things like Java and ActiveX since the early 2000s) is Trusted Timestamping [1], where a trusted third party provides a signature (such as via RFC 3161 Time Stamp Protocol). AFAIK every certificate authority that sells code-signing certificates also provides a free timestamping server. If you trust a CA to issue code-signing certificates, the theory is you'd trust them to timestamp too.If you don't like having the trusted third party, you can also publish the hash in some write-once medium, such as on the blockchain, in certificate transparency logs, or in the small ads of a reputable newspaper.
This trusted timestamping relies on the same signing things with public and private keys process so it just adds a step, it doesn’t solve the problem. The timestamping key needs to expire as well and then it can’t be trusted anymore.
Admittedly, CAs are held to higher standards than most certificate users in terms of keeping keys in hardware security modules and suchlike. So perhaps it's not 100% unjustified that they get longer validity periods.
With this, the time when code-signed application is executed doesn't matter at all, fake date or not.
You could just as well have certificates that never expire and just start signing with a new one if you feel like it.
Note the Mozilla ‘solution’ has the same problem: their root now authorized a new certificate with the old public key. If the original expectation was that the private key would be safe for a certain number of years (which is why you have expiry dates in the first place) the unsafe private key is now valid again. This defeats the purpose of expiry.