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Re:Technical Details on the Recent Firefox Add-On Outage by SAI_Peregrinus on Thursday May 09, 2019 @07:42PM (#19873617)
Mozilla is already packaging the executable inside an archive. That archive contains the executable, manifest, and any other needed files. The signer can add a timestamp, either as a new file or as a part of the manifest. Then the timestamp is signed along with everything else, and can be checked for validity.
Re:Technical Details on the Recent Firefox Add-On Outage by johncolanduoni on Thursday May 09, 2019 @07:57PM (#19873730)
If all extensions are signed by Mozilla’s own certificate, then adding a timestamp won’t do anything for the reason I outlined above and they should just turn off expiration validation altogether. The time of code signing check is only useful if you want to trust one certificate (the developers) to sign things only within the duration noted in the cert, but are willing to trust another certificate (e.g. Microsoft’s timestamp cert) forever. If there’s only one certificate in play owned by the authority for the whole system, then there’s no point in the timestamp at all (for validation purposes).