Edit: it looks like people have found other issues since I last looked at this bug:
> It's a serious issue affecting many common user flows, including the flow of visiting a website coming from a GMail link. If the user comes from GMail, it reaches the destination website without any cookies, thereby breaking functionalities that depend on session/login cookie and CSRF cookie. Only fix for now seems to be removing the Lax flag from cookies. (https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=188165#c47)
At this point, it looks like the safest approach is to only emit sameSite if the browser isn't safari.
If so, it sounds like the next trick to follow would be a type of "redirect gadget" to get SameSite=Strict to be exploitable again. If so, maybe it's only the end of CSRFs without a gadget.
Eg of "redirect gadget", CSRF via VICTIM.COM/open-redirect?url=/update-password...
And then I saw your username... Ah, of course! :)
To get the cookies to work from EVIL.COM, VICTIM.COM's developers will have to explicitly set SameSite=None on their session cookies. Which nobody will do, because nobody sets SameSite at all today.
Better still: 99 out of 100 CSRF exploits (maybe 999 out of 1000) target endpoints for which SameSite=None isn't needed; they're cookies nobody ever uses cross-site to begin with. There are only limited cases where anyone needs the behavior to change, and those cases don't track the most sensitive cookies.
As a vulnerability researcher for whom exploitable bugs mostly exist to spark joy: good riddance to CSRF. It was a dumb bug class, and never, ever fun to exploit.